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1 Introduction
Financial Risk Management is a new topic in the empirical nance literature
thanks in part to the creation of new databases on hedging activities. Many
questions have been raised and are still without satisfactory answers: What are
the value and the motivations of using these tools (i.e. derivatives)? Is there a
theoretical framework that could explain these activities?
There is a controversy in the nance industry about the value of hedging.
Firms use derivatives in order to x the price paid or/and received, this could be
useful as a tool to predict cash ows expenses or/and income and for the rm to
be able to produce less uncertain expected balance-sheet. Moreover, derivatives
can be also used for speculation, for example on a specic commodity price, but
this is an uno¢ cial practice since risk management has normally no speculative
purpose. For portfolio managers, a rm that hedges its activities seems less
risky but hedging also erases exposition and so a speculative return. Hence,
we observe a dual e¤ect and it is not trivial to determine the e¤ect of using
derivatives on the rm market value.
The aim of this paper is to check empirically the implications that could be
derived from the model proposed by Boyer, Boyer and Garcia (2005) (BBG)
and to study a new determinant for the motivation of corporate hedging. The
study of their theoretical framework lead us to analyse two empirical relations
out of the nancial risk management subject: the rst one between the mix of
activities chosen by the rm (i.e. the rm structure) and the risk premium; the
second between the rm market value and the risk free rate dependent on the
rms beta level. The third and last empirical relation is the exibility of the
rm and the use of derivatives for hedging.
For the theoretical literature4 review, we begin with the Modigliani and
Miller (M&M) world where the rm value is determined by its activities and
investment decisions and not by its nancial structure. Therefore in this frame-
work, nancial risk management has no value. More recently, Smith and Stulz
(1985) have relaxed the perfect market assumption made by M&M, nding that
a rm which maximizes its value, hedges its activities for three reasons: taxes,
nancial distress cost and managers risk aversion. Thus, in this model, nancial
risk management has some value for these rst two reasons.
In the empirical literature5 , many papers6 are related to a specic industry
(ex: natural gas) or to a specic risk (ex: currency risk and the use of currency
swaps or other currency derivatives). We can cite two papers which relate
empirical results including almost every industry (with the exception of the
4See the Appendix for a complete theoretical literature review of nancial risk management
motivations and valuation.
5See the Appendix for a review of determinants of corporate hedging activities studied
in the empirical literature. We decompose the results in function of the dependant variable,
which is either the level of hedging (for example the notionnal value of derivatives used) or
the decision of hedging (binary variable, equals 1 if the rm uses derivatives).
6See for example: Allayannis, G. and Weston, J.P. (2001), Dionne, G. and Garand, M.
(2003), Tufano, P. (1996), and Viswanathan, G. (1998).
5
nancial industry because they are users and providers of derivatives). The
rst one from Mian (1996) underlines that the nancial distress cost reason is
not empirically validated, and the one for taxes is mitigated; however, he has
found a signicant size e¤ect. The second, from Graham and Rogers (2002),
found a new empirical reason why rms hedge: to increase debt capacity.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, BBG model and three majors
theoretical relations are explained. In section 3, the empirical methodology and
results are exposed. Finally, section 4 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Model
2.1 BBG Model Presentation7
A rm is decomposed by realized and possible projects represented in a Ei  
SCORim framework. Ei are the expected cash ows from the project i. The
second component is the scaled correlation of the project i: SCORim = imi,
where im is the correlation of the cash ows of the project i with the market
return m and i is the standard deviation of the project is cash ows.
Given all the constraints faced by the rm such as technology or regulation,
we can construct a frontier of possibilities for cash ows. The envelope of all
feasible combinations is by construction concave. In our model, we assume there
is a single risk factor: the market portfolio. Hence, a rm j is valued in terms
of its expected cash ows discounted by an expected rate of return given by the
CAPM:
ERj = RF + jm  (E[RM ] RF )
with the risk free rate (RF ), the expected market return (E[RM ]) and its
beta (jm):
For simplicity, we assume that cash ows are constant through time. So the
value of the rm is Vj =
Ej
ERj
where Ej are the total expected cash ows of the
rm for the next period. We can express the security market line in terms of
cash ows:
Ej = Vj  ERj = Vj RF + Vj  jm  (E[RM ] RF ):
Vj  jm represents the risk of the rms cash ows:
Vj  jm = Vj  Cov[Rj ;Rm]2[Rm] = Cov[VjRj ;Rm]2[Rm] = Cov[CFj ;Rm]2[Rm] :
So we now have that:
Ej = Vj RF + jm  j  (E[RM ] RF )[Rm]
and therefore the value of the rm is:
Vj =
1
RF
[Ej   jm  j  (E[RM ] RF )[Rm] ]:
An iso-value line represents combinations of Ej and SCORjm with the same
market value. From the last equation, iso-value lines are linear and parallel, with
a slope equal to the market price of risk: (E[RM ] RF )[Rm] :
In order to calculate the rm value, we can discount the zero-SCOR expected
cash ows level (C) from the iso-value line at the risk free rate RF : V = CRF :
7For more detailed proofs and explanations, see Boyer, Boyer and Garcia (2005).
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Figure 1 - Firm Valuation Example
In the gure above, there are 50 projects simulated in red and a frontier of
possibilities in blue (here for the construction of the frontier we have dened
bound constraints: each project represents between 0 and 15% of the nal
mix). The black line is the iso-value line dened by the market parameters
(market return, volatility and the risk free rate). In the gure, T0 is the optimal
combination and C0 is the zero-SCOR expected cash ows level, that we could
use for a risk-neutral valuation (FirmMarketV alue = C0RF ). In this framework,
all shocks in the market are translated into variations of the market parameters,
and the rm must change its project combination in order to keep an optimal
value8 . Therefore, the rm should change its prole (more or less risky) after a
variation of the risk premium, it is a sort of "Substitution E¤ect"9 . We predict
that a more exible rm would change more its mix of activities following a
shock in the market due to the concavity of its frontier of possibilities. We can
also observe a "Revenue E¤ect" with the variation of the risk free rate as we
use it to discount the risk neutral cash-ows of the rm10 .
In the BBG Model, the authors propose a decomposition of the real-assets-
management activities of a rm by POM (production and operation manage-
ment) and RRM (real-risk management) without the same goal (POMs goal
is to raise expected cash ows and RRMs goal is to lower risk). They sug-
gest some possible conicts between these two entities and underline that the
exibility added through nancial risk management could resolve this problem
of coordination. In this paper, we adopt their valuation framework, then we
8See Proposition 1
9See Propositions 2 and 3
10See Proposition 4
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consider the POM-RRM decomposition and the problem of coordination for the
explanation of nancial risk management.
2.2 BBG Model Propositions
In this subsection, we complete the analysis of the four propositions from the
BBG paper:
Proposition 1 To maximize its value, a rm must equate its marginal rate of
substitution, the rate at which it can substitute POM and RRM activities while
remaining on its e¢ cient frontier, to the market price of risk:
 @(OM)@(RM) =   @E@SCORM (CFj ;RM ) jH(E;SCORM )=0=
(E[RM ] RF )
[Rm] :
In other words, to maximize its value, a rm takes a combination of projects
which is on the possibility frontier and tangent to the iso-value line. This is a
project portfolio value maximization comparable to the one from asset manage-
ment. To test this assumption, we need details on realized and possible rm
projects. As it is really unlikely to obtain this very condential information, we
can not check this proposition.
Proposition 2 A rm reacts to an increase in the volatility of market returns,
which reduces the price of risk, by modifying its RRM and POM activities to
increase both its expected cash ows E and scaled correlation SCOR.
Proposition 3 A rm reacts to an increase in the expected market return,
which increases the price of risk, by modifying its RRM and POM activities to
reduce both its expected cash ows E and scaled correlation SCOR.
Proposition 4 An increase in the risk-free rate induces an increase in both
the risk taken by a rm and its expected cash ows. Firm value increases if its
original beta is larger than 1. When the original beta is less than 1, the direct
e¤ect is to lower rm value; a rm can alleviate and even reverse this direct
e¤ect by optimally adjusting its portfolio of projects.
Through propositions 2, 3 and 4, we nd a relation between the market price
of risk variation and project portfolio management. The various market para-
meters used in these propositions can be grouped together by the risk premium
(i.e. the market price of risk: (E[RM ] RF )[Rm] ) calculation. So the rm structure
should be more(or less) risky for negative (or positive) variation of the risk pre-
mium. The rm structure represents the choice of projects by the rm, and a
structure more risky means higher SCOR and expected cash ows.
From proposition 4, there is a relation between the rm market value, the
risk free rate variation and the beta of the rm.
9
2.3 Flexibility & Financial Risk Management
From the BBG Model, the coordination problem from POM and ROM activi-
ties could explain the use of derivatives to reach the optimal project portfolio.
Their valuation framework allows to observe the value added by nancial risk
management in case of coordination problems. As the rm structure (i.e. the
project portfolio choice) moves with respect to the E-SCOR position, nancial
risk management brings smoothness in their state-position variation. We can
omit coordination conicts and consider that hedging allows more exibility in
the project portfolio management. Therefore, from the BBG model steams a
new proposition that could be tested:
Proposition 5 There exists a positive relation between the rm structure ex-
ibility (i.e. variations of rms activities) and the use of derivatives.
2.4 Theoretical Conclusion
From the study of this framework, we detect three relations that could be em-
pirically observed:
 Project portfolio management & risk premium
 Firm value, its beta & risk free rate
 Firm structure exibility & nancial risk management
Hence, through this model we explore new assumptions for the valuation of
a rm and its choices of activities. Then, we nd a new determinant for the
use of derivatives. In the next section, we empirically check these assumptions
and confront the rm structure exibility with other validated determinants for
hedging explanation.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Database & Methodology
The database was created from Compustat for accounting data, then Bloomberg
and CRSP for market data. The sample is composed of rms from the US
S&P500 selected in 2004. Firms lacking important data have been dropped
from the sample. The nal sample is made of 464 enterprises. The database
was extracted for the years 1993 to 2004. Concerning the Flexibility Factor
determination, only rms with complete data for the all time segment were
retained. Thus, the nal sample for this subsection represents 270 enterprises;
hedging, managerial11 shareholding and option ownership data were extracted
from EDGAR US Database. Finally, for this empirical study, Matlab, Stata
and Excel softwares were used.
All the market data are selected at end of the year (example: 12/31/2004
for the year 2004), and the expected value is estimated by the realized one
(hypothesis of perfect forecast). For instance, we consider the operating income
reported in the annual report for the estimation of expected cash ows.
3.2 Risk Premium - Firm Structure
3.2.1 Market Data
D a t e T B 1m o n th Vo la t i l i ty R e t u rn R is k P r em ium V 1 . R i s k P r em ium V 2 . R i s k P r em ium
1 9 9 3 2 .9 4% 8 .6 8% 7 .0 6% 4 7 .4 2%
1 9 9 4 4 .7 4% 9 .9 3% -1 .5 4% -6 3 ;1 9% -2 3 3 .2 6% -1 1 0 .6 1%
1 9 9 5 4 .5 8% 7 .8 8% 3 4 .1 1% 3 7 4 .7 2% 6 9 2 .9 8% 4 3 7 .9 1%
1 9 9 6 4 .8 7% 1 1 .8 8% 2 0 .2 6% 1 2 9 .5 1% -6 5 .4 4% -2 4 5 .2 1%
1 9 9 7 5 .1 1% 1 8 .3 6% 3 1 .0 1% 1 4 1 .0 8% 8 .9 3% 1 1 .5 7%
1 9 9 8 4 .3 9% 2 0 .6 2% 2 6 .6 7% 1 0 8 .0 3% -2 3 .4 2% -3 3 .0 5%
1 9 9 9 5 .1 0% 1 8 .2 6% 1 9 .5 3% 7 9 .0 1% -2 6 .8 6% -2 9 .0 2%
2 0 0 0 5 .7 7% 2 2 .3 3% -1 0 .1 4% -7 1 .2 4% -1 9 0 .1 7% -1 5 0 .2 6%
2 0 0 1 1 .6 4% 2 2 .0 8% -1 3 .0 4% -6 6 .4 7% 6 .7 1% 4 .7 8%
2 0 0 2 1 .1 4% 2 6 .0 7% -2 3 .3 7% -9 4 .0 0% -4 1 .4 2% -2 7 .5 3%
2 0 0 3 0 .8 3% 1 7 .2 3% 2 6 .3 8% 1 4 8 .3 1% 2 5 7 .7 7% 2 4 2 .3 1%
2 0 0 4 1 .9 1% 1 1 .1 9% 8 .9 9% 6 3 .2 9% -5 7 .3 3% -8 5 .0 2%
Table 1 - Risk Premium12
11For the determination of managerial shareholding and option ownership, we analyse the
portfolio of the top ve executives of the rm.
12 In our paper, we use a risk premium by unit of volatility but denote it simply risk premium.
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Note: TB means T-Bills (we select TB 1 Month as the risk free rate). Market Volatility
and Market Return are calculated from the US S&P500 return. Market Volatility is an
historical volatility calculated with n equals 260 (equivalent for the number of trading days in
a year). The risk premium, and its variations are calculated as follows:
RP = RM RF[Rm]
V 1:RPt =
RPt RPt 1
jRPt 1j13
V 2:RP t= RP t RP t 1
Since the market return is on the nominator and the market volatility is
on the denominator in RP calculation, we select years where variations of the
market volatility and return have opposite signs in order to obtain the same
expectation from propositions 2 and 3 relating to E[CF] and SCOR variations.
Thus, we will study the following years: 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002 and 2003.
3.2.2 E[CF] and SCOR Variations Analysis14
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3
V .O m s ig n + - + + + -
V .R m s ig n - + - - - +
V .S C O R & C F , e x p e c t e d s ig n + - + + + -
N t o t a l 2 9 0 3 0 7 3 2 0 4 0 7 4 4 2 4 6 0
M e a n V .S C O R 0 .4 1 0 .2 2 3 .2 4 2 .4 2 0 .8 4 0 .2 1
M e a n V .C F 0 .2 5 0 .2 0 0 .4 6 0 .3 4 0 .9 1 0 .2 6
t -Te s t M e a n V .S C O R = 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0
t -Te s t M e a n V .C F = 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0
Table 2 - SCOR & CF Variations: Statistics Results
Note: V.Om and V.Rm are the Market Volatility and Return variations. V.SCOR and
V.CF are estimated with the following equation (absolute value in the denominator to keep
the direction of the variation as SCOR and the operating income could be negative): V:Xt =
Xt Xt 1
jXt 1j : For the t-Test, the validated alternative is written (there is a blank if no conclusion
could be made on the sign of the variation with a 90% condence level).
The expected cash ows of the rm are estimated as the operating income
from the annual report. The SCOR is hard to estimate as it is the product of
the cash ows standard deviation with the correlation between the cash ows
and the market return. As it is proved below, we can estimate the SCOR of the
14Distribution estimations for CF and SCOR variations by the kernel-gaussian estimation
method are set in the appendix.
12
rm from its beta, its market value and the market volatility, which are easy to
nd. Firm market value is the total number of shares times the stock price.
SCOR [CFi; Rm] =  [CFi] Corr [CFi; Rm] =  [CFi] Cov[CFi;Rm][CFi]  [Rm]
=  [CFi] FirmMarketV alue
iCov[Ri;Rm]
[CFi]  [Rm]
= FirmMarketV aluei   [Rm] Cov[Ri;Rm]2[Rm]
= FirmMarketV aluei   [Rm] im
It should be a growth e¤ect as all means of V.SCOR and V.CF are positive
(bear in mind that there is censure bias because we observe only rms that have
survived till 2004). V.SCORs means are by far lower when the predicted sign is
negative and for V.CF, it is the same (except for 2004). It seems that the data
are in the direction of our theoretical relation, but more precise work is needed
to validate it. In the next subsection, we decompose the risk premium variation
in its three market parameters and so we control for their di¤erent variations.
3.2.3 Panel Data Analysis
In this subsection (and the one in the Risk Free Rate - Market Value), we adopt
two di¤erent assumptions on how the rm adapts its activities:
 V.Xt = Xt  Xt 1 : there is an instant adaptation of the rm.
 V.Xt = Xt 1  Xt 2 : the rm adapts its activities based on the market
parameters variations of the previous year.
We use a Panel-Probit Model with the SCOR (then CF) variation as depen-
dant variable (= 1 if V.SCOR  0 (then if V.CF  0);= 0 elsewise) and the
variations of the Risk Free Rate, Market Return and Volatility as independant
variables.
V.Xt=Xt-Xt 1 V.Xt=Xt 1-Xt 2
Predicted Sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
V.Rf + 2.51 0.055 6.64 0.000
V.Rm - 1.17 0.000 0.43 0.001
V.Om + 11.60 0.000 5.66 0.000
Chi-Square Pvalue Chi-Square Pvalue
459.87 0.000 119.13 0.000
Table 3 - SCOR: Panel-Probit Results
13
V.Xt=Xt-Xt 1 V.Xt=Xt 1-Xt 2
Predicted Sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
V.Rf + 18.37 0.000 10.80 0.000
V.Rm - 0.32 0.005 0.85 0.000
V.Om + 1.28 0.026 0.46 0.552
Chi-Square Pvalue Chi-Square Pvalue
171.49 0.000 109.43 0.000
Table 4 - CF: Panel-Probit Results
In both cases, the sign observed for V.Rm is the opposite to the one pre-
dicted. Therefore, with our results we can not conclude about the relation
between the rm structure and the risk premium. However, our statistics pre-
sented in 3.2.2 lead us to believe that there may exist a relation and we need
to adopt a more sophisticated approach for the determination of how the rm
adapts its activities. For instance, the rm could predict the market parameter
and react in function of the predicted value and the value of the previous period:
V.Xt = cXt   Xt 1. The prediction would be based on the model used in the
industry, for instance a GARCH (1,1) for the prediction of the volatility.
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3.3 Risk Free Rate - Market Value
3.3.1 Market Data
D a t e T B 1m o n th T B 3m o n th s F E D Ta r g e t R a t e V . T B 1m o n th
1 9 9 3 2 .9 4% 3 .0 5% 3 .0 0%
1 9 9 4 4 .7 4% 5 .6 4% 5 .5 0% 6 0 .8 4%
1 9 9 5 4 .5 8% 5 .0 5% 5 .5 0% -3 .2 3%
1 9 9 6 4 .8 7% 5 .1 4% 5 .2 5% 6 .3 7%
1 9 9 7 5 .1 1% 5 .3 1% 5 .5 0% 4 .8 0%
1 9 9 8 4 .3 9% 4 .4 3% 4 .7 5% -1 3 .9 8%
1 9 9 9 5 .1 0% 5 .3 3% 5 .5 0% 1 6 .1 1%
2 0 0 0 5 .7 7% 5 .8 4% 6 .5 0% 1 3 .0 7%
2 0 0 1 1 .6 4% 1 .7 1% 1 .7 5% -7 1 .6 4%
2 0 0 2 1 .1 4% 1 .1 9% 1 .2 5% -3 0 .5 6%
2 0 0 3 0 .8 3% 0 .9 3% 1 .0 0% -2 7 .2 0%
2 0 0 4 1 .9 1% 2 .2 2% 2 .2 5% 1 3 0 .7 1%
Table 5 - Risk Free Rate
1994, 2001 and 2004 are the years with the greatest variations, and 2001 is
the best year to observe the market value variation as the market volatility and
return are not so far from being constant (see Risk Premium Table). So in 2001,
we almost control for the two other parameters of the risk premium and should
observe only the risk free rate e¤ect on rm market value.
3.3.2 Market Value Variation Analysis
1 9 9 4 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 4
V .M V E x p e c t e d s ig n , b e t a<1 - + -
V .M V E x p e c t e d s ig n , b e t a>1 + - +
N , b e t a<1 1 3 5 2 4 0 2 1 0
N , b e t a>1 1 7 1 2 0 4 2 5 4
N t o t a l 3 0 6 4 4 4 4 6 4
M e a n V .M V , b e t a<1 - 0 .0 0 5 5 0 .0 7 9 6 0 .1 9 4 0
M e a n V .M V , b e t a>1 0 .1 1 1 9 0 .0 1 8 0 0 .1 9 9 0
P r o p o r t io n V .M V>0 , b e t a<1 4 4 .4 4% 5 2 .0 8% 8 3 .8 1%
P ro p o r t io n V .M V>0 , b e t a>1 5 8 .4 8% 4 5 .5 9% 7 1 .2 6%
t -Te s t d i¤ e r e n c e V .M V b e t a<1 - V .M V b e t a>1 <0 >0
t -Te s t M e a n V .M V = 0 , b e t a<1 <0 >0 >0
t -Te s t M e a n V .M V = 0 , b e t a>1 >0 >0
Table 6 - Market Value Variation: Statistics Results
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Note: MV is the Market Value, and V.MVt=
MVt MVt 1
MVt 1
: For the t-Test, the validated
alternative is written (there is a blank if no conclusion could be made on the sign of the
variation with a 90% condence level).
For 2001, we observe the theoretical assumption: the proportion of rms
with a positive market value variation is higher for rms with a beta lower
than 1. For 1994, the expectation is also correct but not for 2004 (but the risk
premium variation was high in this year). So to complete this study, we need
regressions to control for the di¤erent parameters of the risk premium.15
3.3.3 Linear Regression
1994 2001 2004
Expected B sign + - +
B beta 0.053 -0.050 -0.064
Pvalue 0.311 0.234 0.098
R-square 0.3273 0.0645 0.1451
B betasup1 0.020 -0.035 -0.037
Pvalue 0.509 0.444 0.214
R-square 0.3224 0.0611 0.1407
Table 7 - Regression Analysis
Two regressions (with robust residuals) are done:
FirmMarketV aluei = 0 +B  i + 0 Xi + "i
FirmMarketV aluei = 0+B i+0Xi+i, with i = 1 if i1 and
= 0 elsewise.
Xi is the vector of controling variables: dividend variation, dividend yield,
cash ows variation, book-market value ratio, long term debt-market value ratio,
sales variation and total assets. B represents the regression coe¢ cient of the
dummy  (B betasup1) or of  (B beta):
For 1994 and 2001 the results are coherent with the theoretical relation, but
not for 2004. Even if we control for individual characteristics, we must take into
account the risk premium e¤ect to indepth this study.
15Distribution estimations for the Market Value variation by the kernel-gaussian estimation
method are set in the appendix.
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3.3.4 Panel Data Analysis
We use a Panel-Probit Model with the Firm Market Value variation as depen-
dant variable (= 1 if MV  0 ;= 0 elsewise) and the variations of the Risk
Free Rate (with a coe¢ cient value depending on the beta value), Market Return
and Volatility as independant variables. We proceed by making two models, the
rst one with a decomposition if the beta is superior or inferior than the unity,
and the second one with more gradual partitions. For the predicted signs of
the Rm and Om coe¢ cients, we study the e¤ect of these market parame-
ter variations on discounted CF and so the rm value with the gure "Firm
Valuation Example" in 2.1.
V.Xt=Xt-Xt 1 V.Xt=Xt 1-Xt 2
Predicted Sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
V.Rf beta<1 - 9.68 0.000 16.36 0.000
V.Rf beta>1 + 14.90 0.000 27.93 0.000
V.Rm - 1.17 0.000 0.43 0.000
V.Om + 11.60 0.034 5.66 0.000
Chi-Square Pvalue Chi-Square Pvalue
343.03 0.000 323.77 0.000
V.Rf beta<0.5 - - 10.20 0.000 11.70 0.003
V.Rf 0.5<beta<1 - 9.36 0.000 17.55 0.000
V.Rf 1<beta<1.5 + 12.67 0.000 26.46 0.000
V.Rf beta>1.5 + + 18.02 0.000 31.09 0.000
V.Rm - 1.73 0.000 1.22 0.000
V.Om + -1.15 0.300 3.76 0.000
Chi-Square Pvalue Chi-Square Pvalue
344.70 0.000 324.52 0.000
Table 8 - Market Value: Panel-Probit Results
Depending on the rms adaptation assumption, we observe either the in-
verse sign of the prediction for Rm and Om coe¢ cients or only for Rm
coe¢ cient. Thus, we can not validate the implication of BBG Model on the
relation between the rm market value and the market parameters. However,
given the results in 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, we observe empirical evidences in
favor of a relation between the risk free rate, the market value of the rm and
its beta. Firms with a higher beta seem to react more to a variation of the risk
free rate16 but we can not conclude whether there is a di¤erence on the sign
of the market value variation depending on the rms beta. We need a more
16At rst sight, this result seems obvious since the beta is the measure of how the rms
stock price reacts to variations in the market, but by denition beta is just correlated with
the market return, so we do not know exactly the relation with the risk free rate.
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sophisticated model to conclude seriously; we can modify the rms adaptation
assumption, and take into account one with a predicted value of the market
parameters as proposed in 3.2.3.
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3.4 Firm Structure Flexibility - Corporate Hedging
3.4.1 Firm Structure Flexibility Factor
First, we need to evaluate the position variation of the rm structure. We used
two methods to estimate this variation, the distance between the two combina-
tions in the CF-SCOR space and the curvature of the frontier of possibilities.
 Distance between two positions:
V P1t =
q
jSCORt   SCORt 1j2 + jCFt   CFt 1j2=F irmMarketV aluet
 Curvature of the frontier of possibilities:
V P2t =
CFt CFt 1
SCORt SCORt 1 =F irmMarketV aluet
Second, we calculate the risk premium (RP) also with two methods:
V 1RPt =
RPt RPt 1
jRPt 1j
V 2RPt = RPt  RPt 1
Finally, we regress the rm structure variation on the risk premium variation,
thus we have four di¤erent regressions:
V P:it = 0 + 
i
1  V:RPt + "it
i1 represents the Flexibility Factor or the sensibility of the rm structure to
variations in the risk premium.
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VP1V1RP VP1V2RP VP2V1RP VP2V2RP
VP1V1RP 1.0000
VP1V2RP 0.9251 1.0000
VP2V1RP 0.0117 0.0083 1.0000
VP2V2RP 0.0242 0.0236 0.9104 1.0000
Beta 2004 -0.1427 -0.2498 0.0560 0.0517
Beta 2001 -0.2892 -0.3852 0.0100 0.0140
Beta 1994 -0.1347 -0.1948 0.0529 0.0771
Assets 2004 0.0405 0.0594 0.0267 0.0398
Assets 2001 0.0506 0.0642 0.0252 0.0370
Assets 1994 0.0816 0.0894 0.0154 0.0303
Mvalue 2004 0.0204 0.0603 -0.0021 0.0157
Mvalue 2001 0.0150 0.0562 -0.0029 0.0116
Mvalue 1994 0.0257 0.0620 -0.0002 0.0143
DivYield2004 0.0056 0.0526 0.0068 0.0179
BV/MV 2004 0.0079 -0.0648 0.0912 0.0400
SCOR 2004 0.0040 0.0310 -0.0023 0.0162
CF 2004 0.0626 0.0899 0.0067 0.0206
Table 9 - Flexibility Factor - Correlation Table
Through the study of the correlation table, we observe that VP1V2RP (i.e.i1
from the regression V P1it = 0+
i
1V 2RPt+ "it) is the best estimator for the
rm structure exibility:
 Beta: there should be a negative relation between the beta of the rm
and its exibility factor. A rm that can change its activities easily after
a change in the market (i.e. a variation of the risk premium) should be less
"risky", this is translated into a lower beta. As proposed by Stulz (2004),
a rm can become more exible so that it has lower xed costs in a cyclical
downturn. It is coherent with the correlation analysis, VP1V2RP is more
negatively correlated in 2001.
 Size e¤ect: a big rm should be more exible as they have more projects
and so a more concave frontier of possibilities. Here it is estimated by the
positive correlation with the rm market value and the rm total assets
(mv and assets).
 Growth opportunities: we can estimate the investment or growth opportu-
nities by the ratio FirmMarketV alueFirmBookV alue , here we observe a negative correlation
with the inverse of this ratio (BVMV2004). It is coherent with the intu-
ition that a more exible rm should have more investment opportunities.
Therefore, we select VP1V2RP as the exibilitor factor.
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3.4.2 Corporate Hedging Variable
In this paper, we consider the use of derivatives as the only tool for hedging.
We do not estimate "natural" hedging tools like foreign denominated debt in
substitution of currency Swap or the fact that cash outows and inows are
synchronized.
To evaluate the use of derivatives, there are three instruments: a dummy
for hedging or not, the total notional value and the fair market value of deriv-
atives. These informations are included in the annual report; the database was
extracted from EDGAR. The most reliable estimator is the last one as it is the
actual value of the rm position and it is not positively biased as the notional
value (because short and long positions have contrary nancial e¤ects and so
the net position could be null).
Therefore, our explained variable for the level of hedging is:
FRM = FairMarketV alueOfDerivativesTotalAssets
We will also study the level of hedging with the absolute value of the previous
variable.
Then, we will consider the decision of hedging with a dummy (= 1 if the
rm is hedged, = 0 elsewhere) and also if the rm is hedged for the following
risk: foreign exchange (currency), debt nancing (interest rate), commodity and
equity.
3.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables17
The literature gives us several determinants for the use of derivatives:
 Risk aversion of the managers (managerial shareholding [+] and manage-
rial option ownership [-])
 Investment or growth opportunities (Market V alueBook V alue [+] and R&D ExpensesTotal Assets
[+])
 Firm size (Total Assets [+])
 Financial distress cost (Long Term DebtsMarket Value [+])
17Note that in parenthesis are variables we used to estimate determinants and in brackets
are predicted signs of the relation between determinants and the use of derivatives
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 Dividend distributed (Dividend Yield [+])
 Firm liquidity (Quick Ratio: Current Assets - InventoriesCurrent Liabilities [-])
 Currency rate (Foreign SalesTotal Sales [+])
 Tax credits (Net Operating Loss Carry ForwardTotal Assets [+])
 Industry e¤ect (dummy industry, we will use it as a control variable and
so we do not analyse the predicted relation in respect of the industry type)
3.4.4 Level of Hedging
In subsections 3.4.4, 3.4.5 and 3.4.6, we censor the nance industry since their
quick ratio and foreign sales are calculated di¤erently. Thus, our sample for
these subsections represents 238 rms with 190 rms hedged. Moreover all
econometric results are presented with and without control of the industry (bi-
nary variable for each type of industry).
In order to study the level of hedging of the rm, we use a Heckman selection
model. The rst step is the decision of hedging or not, then for the ones who
decide to use derivatives, the second step is the determination of the level of
hedging (i.e. fair value of derivatives divided by total assets).
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Not controlled by industry Controlled by industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
1) DECISION
Flexibility + 11.50 0.348 6.57 0.620
Log(Assets) + 0.32 0.024 0.26 0.068
DividendYield + -0.001 0.847 -0.001 0.902
MV / BV + 0.01 0.774 0.04 0.266
LT Debt / MV + 0.06 0.546 -0.01 0.803
R&D / Assets + -2.25 0.480 -3.93 0.243
Quick Ratio - -0.19 0.033 -0.20 0.024
FgSales / Sales + 1.72 0.001 1.69 0.004
NOL / Assets + 3.42 0.209 4.01 0.176
Log (MngShare) + -0.02 0.755 -0.03 0.625
Log(MngOption) - -0.15 0.066 -0.14 0.120
2) LEVEL
Flexibility + -0.47 0.515 -0.19 0.784
Log(Assets) + 0.001 0.809 0.004 0.460
DividendYield + -0.0001 0.474 -0.0002 0.409
MV / BV + 0.00005 0.723 0.00005 0.703
LT Debt / MV + -0.0007 0.509 -0.0006 0.570
R&D / Assets + 0.17 0.265 0.18 0.262
Quick Ratio - 0.01 0.041 0.01 0.032
FgSales / Sales + -0.006 0.864 0.002 0.927
NOL / Assets + -0.09 0.222 -0.07 0.261
Log (MngShare) + -0.004 0.217 -0.004 0.187
Log(MngOption) - 0.001 0.741 0.0006 0.850
Chi-Square Pvalue Chi-Square Pvalue
50.29 0.0005 1066.38 0.0000
Table 10 - Heckman Selection Model - Two Step Estimates
Analysis of the decision of hedging or not will be done in next subsection.
Here for the level of hedging we only observe the Quick Ratio as signicant
variable at a 3% level.
Finally we use a Tobit Model to analyse the absolute value of the level of
hedging as there is a boundary constraint at 0.
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Not controlled by industry Controlled by industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 0.11 0.852 0.06 0.911
Log(Assets) + 0.01 0.028 0.01 0.054
DividendYield + -0.0002 0.323 -0.0002 0.400
MV / BV + 0.0001 0.430 0.0001 0.462
LT Debt / MV + 0.0006 0.536 -0.0006 0.552
R&D / Assets + 0.10 0.446 0.11 0.426
Quick Ratio - 0.001 0.700 0.001 0.691
FgSales / Sales + 0.04 0.040 0.03 0.108
NOL / Assets + -0.06 0.376 -0.06 0.382
Log (MngStock) + -0.004 0.112 -0.005 0.100
Log(MngOption) - -0.002 0.447 -0.001 0.678
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
-0.0365 -0.0520
Table 11 - Tobit Estimates
There is only the size e¤ect signicant at 5%. Therefore, through these two
models, we do not have conclusive remarks and we will focus on the decision of
hedging in the following subsections.
3.4.5 Decision of Hedging by type of risk
To analyse the decision of hedging (in general or by type of risk) we use a Probit
model (i.e. = 1 if the rme is hedged, = 0 elsewise).
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Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 11.5068 0.312 6.571987 0.591
Log(Assets) + 0.3216768 0.023 0.2641823 0.052
DividendYield + -0.0014458 0.728 -0.0010982 0.824
MV / BV + 0.0120769 0.692 0.0465467 0.070
LT Debt / MV + 0.0675131 0.524 -0.0171553 0.607
R&D / Assets + -2.25837 0.489 -3.930239 0.246
Quick Ratio - -0.1919256 0.026 -0.2073532 0.019
FgSales/Sales + 1.721713 0.000 1.695177 0.001
NOL / Assets + 3.428797 0.091 4.012649 0.074
Log (MngShare) + -0.0215893 0.727 -0.0391059 0.586
Log (MngOption) - -0.155596 0.039 -0.147289 0.078
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.1864 0.2432
Table 12 - Hedging - Probit Estimates
We found six signicant coe¢ cients at a 10% level and coherent with their
predicted sign. These determinants have already been empirically validated, so
this is an indication that our database respects results from the literature.
Now, we will decompose the decision of hedging for four di¤erent risks. In
this way, rms could use derivatives for foreign exchange risk (currency risk),
debt nancing risk (interest rate risk), commodity risk and equity risk (stock
price of their investments).
Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 6.72731 0.549 3.528217 0.761
Log(Assets) + 0.0182462 0.873 0.0692736 0.575
DividendYield + 0.0120924 0.143 0.0108115 0.223
MV / BV + -0.002438 0.204 -0.0031078 0.092
LT Debt / MV + 0.0088812 0.597 0.0102492 0.515
R&D / Assets + 1.8561214 0.585 -0.2841436 0.935
Quick Ratio - -0.25965 0.008 -0.2523647 0.009
FgSales / Sales + 3.154949 0.000 2.767154 0.000
NOL / Assets + 6.884948 0.024 5.838456 0.049
Log (MngShare) + 0.0352815 0.552 0.0514244 0.422
Log (MngOption) - 0.0004915 0.994 -0.0024615 0.973
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.2786 0.3128
Table 13 - Foreign Exchange Risk - Probit Estimates
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As expected, the foreign exposition (Foreign Sales / Sales) is the most sig-
nicant coe¢ cient for the decision of currency hedging.
Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + -4.155881 0.705 -7.975913 0.464
Log(Assets) + 0.4263028 0.001 0.3745493 0.003
DividendYield + 0.0105719 0.191 0.0132397 0.148
MV / BV + 0.0036536 0.838 0.010641 0.588
LT Debt / MV + 0.026474 0.623 0.0158687 0.655
R&D / Assets + -10.04877 0.002 -10.12231 0.002
Quick Ratio - -0.1379954 0.157 -0.156353 0.125
FgSales / Sales + 0.6127013 0.157 0.4963386 0.295
NOL / Assets + 0.8485563 0.472 1.011427 0.407
Log (MngShare) + 0.0037981 0.951 -0.0084541 0.905
Log (MngOption) - -0.1178394 0.085 -0.104035 0.148
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.2162 0.2170
Table 14 - Debt Financing Risk - Probit Estimates
We notice two unexpected results here: rst, the R&D coe¢ cient is the most
signicant but not with the expected sign, and second the leverage coe¢ cient
is not signicant for the decision of interest rate hedging.
Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 40.89356 0.010 45.90117 0.020
Log(Assets) + 0.4622247 0.000 0.5031496 0.001
DividendYield + -0.0296471 0.013 -0.0451429 0.003
MV / BV + 0.0014883 0.480 0.0023692 0.306
LT Debt /MV + -0.0181029 0.375 -0.0281866 0.222
R&D / Assets + -16.97719 0.001 -13.49775 0.003
Quick Ratio - -0.0594772 0.644 -0.102821 0.463
FgSales / Sales + 0.2903347 0.529 0.1185039 0.817
NOL / Assets + 0.002941 0.999 -0.0667766 0.964
Log (MngShare) + -0.1833148 0.014 -0.1686922 0.067
Log (MngOption) - -0.1039251 0.202 -0.0378697 0.706
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.2197 0.3430
Table 15 - Commodity Risk - Probit Estimates
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Finally, for commodity risk, we observe the exibility factor signicant at a
2% level with the predicted sign. We also notice that the sign of the dividend
yield coe¢ cient is negative and signicant. The theory behind the prediction
of a positive sign is based on a lack of liquidity after a dividend payout, and
therefore an incentive to hedge due to nancial distress cost. But we already
estimate the liquidity e¤ect with the Quick Ratio, thus the dividend yield could
be perceived as an estimator of growth opportunities18 . The ratio Market Value
/ Book Value is an estimator of growth opportunities established by nancial
markets but the dividend yield is an internal signal made by the rm. So, the
dividend yield has a dual e¤ect on the corporate hedging decision, and this
negative sign has a nancial analysis explanation.
Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 42.79679 0.011 29.05127 0.063
Log(Assets) + 0.462395 0.005 0.5087596 0.002
DividendYield + -0.0018588 0.673 -0.0095536 0.107
MV / BV + -0.0058059 0.788 -0.0011117 0.968
LT Debt / MV + -0.0059715 0.864 -0.0131152 0.725
R&D / Assets + 6.376253 0.037 4.967401 0.123
Quick Ratio - 0.1109778 0.197 0.0713692 0.425
FgSales / Sales + -0.3156646 0.564 -0.3033991 0.640
NOL / Assets + 2.322472 0.167 2.233997 0.194
Log (MngShare) + 0.0106017 0.904 0.0661194 0.515
Log (MngOption) - 0.0077272 0.940 -0.0332903 0.748
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.1605 0.1732
Table 16 - Equity Risk - Probit Estimates
The exibility factor is signicant at a 6% level and we observed also a
size e¤ect. The equity risk represents the rms investment and mostly the
subsidiaries traded on nancial markets.
Through these tables, we observed empirical evidences of the signicant
determinants variations in accordance with the sort of risk. Therefore, even if
we control for the type of industry, each kind of risk has specic determinants.
The decomposition of the type of risk hedged (instead of just considering if the
rm is hedged or not) could lead nancial analysts to a better evaluation of the
rm management and of nancial risk management motivations.
18See Gaver & Gaver (1993), and Smith & Watts (1992).
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3.4.6 Number of risks hedged
In connection with the type of risk decomposition considered previously, we
study now the number of risks hedged by the rm. First, we consider all the
four risks presented before: nancing, currency, commodity and equity risk.
Firms could hedge between 0 and 4 sorts of risk; therefore, we use an Ordered
Probit Model to estimate the number of risks hedged as it is a ranked discrete
dependant variable.
Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 17.7106 0.027 11.84588 0.140
Log(Assets) + 0.4311984 0.000 0.4313938 0.000
DividendYield + -0.0013261 0.562 -0.0033614 0.150
MV / BV + 0.0006078 0.569 0.0003143 0.763
LT Debt / MV + 0.0005298 0.958 0.0012068 0.904
R&D / Assets + -3.659068 0.079 -3.693538 0.101
Quick Ratio - -0.1307459 0.079 -0.1648271 0.032
FgSales / Sales + 1.289239 0.000 1.01267 0.002
NOL / Assets + 1.860814 0.020 1.910121 0.150
Log (MngShare) + -0.0434452 0.383 -0.204212 0.708
Log (MngOption) - -0.0694944 0.179 -0.0490349 0.377
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.1175 0.1474
Table 17 - Every Risk - Ordered Probit Estimates
We recognize three signicant factors frequently validated in the empirical
literature: size, liquidity and foreign exposure.
Second, we analyse the number of operational risks hedged. Since opera-
tional risk is related to operations and not nancing, we consider only currency,
commodity and equity risk. Here, rms could hedge between 0 and 3 sorts
of risk, so we also use an Ordered Probit Model to estimate the number of
operational risks hedged.
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Not Controlled by Industry Controlled by Industry
Predicted
sign Coe¢ cient Pvalue Coe¢ cient Pvalue
Flexibility + 25.06966 0.004 18.64157 0.025
Log(Assets) + 0.3290411 0.000 0.3344728 0.001
DividendYield + -0.0023691 0.403 -0.0053856 0.021
MV / BV + -0.0012558 0.289 -0.0016622 0.150
LT Debt / MV + -0.0050441 0.584 -0.0044866 0.625
R&D / Assets + -0.4415766 0.837 -0.6505316 0.781
Quick Ratio - -0.096191 0.180 -0.1296876 0.076
FgSales / Sales + 1.51316 0.000 1.238986 0.000
NOL / Assets + 1.973128 0.058 2.032038 0.048
Log (MngShare) + -0.0594358 0.271 -0.0161126 0.787
Log (MngOption) - -0.0439379 0.464 -0.0211147 0.743
Pseudo R-square Pseudo R-square
0.1149 0.1638
Table 18 - Operational Risk - Ordered Probit Estimates
For operationnal risk, at a 5% level we have size, dividend yield (with a
negative relation as explained in 3.4.5), liquidity, foreign exposure and nally
exibility as signicant factors. This result is intuitive since exiblity is more
related to rm activities (i.e. foreign exchange, commodity and equity risk) and
not to nancing decision (i.e. debt nancing risk).
3.4.7 Industry Analysis
We have used a market value weight for each industry (i.e. FirmMarketV alue =
IndustryMarketV alue ), in order to calculate the mean of the variables below.
Then we have ranked these industries by the Flexibility Factor (the most exible
industry is at the top). Note that the non-classied industry is composed by
only two rms: GE and Textron.
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In d u s t r y F le x ib i l i ty # R is k # O p . R is k H e d g in g F X D eb t C om m E q u i ty F V /A s s e t s A b s F V /A s s e t s
U t i l i ty - 0 .0 0 2 3 2 .1 1 1 1 .2 0 6 1 0 .4 3 3 0 .9 0 6 0 .7 5 5 0 .0 1 8 0 .0 0 2 4 3 0 .0 0 7 1 4
Fo o d -0 .0 0 3 2 2 .6 2 2 1 .7 5 8 1 0 .9 8 2 0 .8 6 4 0 .5 3 0 0 .2 4 6 0 .0 1 1 3 7 0 .0 1 3 7 9
N o n -C la s s ie d - 0 .0 0 3 5 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 .0 0 3 4 9 0 .0 0 3 4 9
M in in g - 0 .0 0 3 9 2 .0 4 3 1 .2 0 8 0 .9 3 7 0 .6 5 6 0 .8 3 5 0 .5 5 2 0 - 0 .0 0 5 6 4 0 .0 0 8 9 6
F in a n c ia l - 0 .0 0 4 2 2 .0 6 7 5 1 .1 3 0 3 1 0 .9 3 7 1 8 0 .5 1 5 0 .9 3 7 2 0 .2 1 2 2 3 0 .4 0 2 9 0 .0 0 7 9 9 0 .0 0 8 9 7 0 6
S e r v i c e - 0 .0 0 4 4 2 .4 6 2 1 .6 7 3 0 .9 1 2 0 .8 8 2 0 .7 8 9 0 .0 1 3 0 .7 7 7 - 0 .0 0 1 7 8 0 .0 0 5 6 7
R e t a i l - 0 .0 0 4 9 1 .2 9 3 0 .6 1 9 0 .7 1 3 0 .5 2 2 0 .6 7 4 0 .0 5 9 0 .0 3 9 0 .0 0 0 5 2 0 .0 0 1 8 1
W h o le s a l e - 0 .0 0 5 3 1 .0 3 0 0 .1 6 3 0 .8 6 7 0 0 .8 6 7 0 .1 6 3 0 - 0 .0 0 0 1 2 0 .0 0 0 6 2
M a nu fa c t u r in g - 0 .0 0 5 4 1 .6 0 8 6 1 .0 2 8 2 6 0 .8 3 3 2 6 0 .7 9 2 0 .5 8 0 3 0 .1 0 8 6 3 0 .1 2 7 5 0 .0 2 5 2 9 2 0 .0 2 7 2 9 9 9
C om m u n ic a t io n - 0 .0 0 6 7 1 .5 2 1 0 .5 2 1 1 0 .5 2 1 1 0 0 0 .0 0 1 4 2 0 .0 0 1 7 1
Tra n s p o r t a t io n - 0 .0 0 9 2 1 .8 2 4 0 .8 2 4 1 0 .4 6 4 1 0 .3 6 0 0 0 .0 1 0 8 7 0 .0 1 0 8 7
C o n s t r u c t io n - 0 .0 1 0 1 1 0 .4 0 1 1 0 .4 0 1 0 .5 9 9 0 0 0 .0 0 0 8 9 0 .0 0 1 5 1
Table 19 - Industry Estimates
We observe a clear dichotomy for the number of risks (total and operationnal)
hedged. The six most exible industries are the ones which have more types
of risk hedged. This analysis by type of industry supports the fact that more
exible rms as we have calculated (i.e. rm structure sensibility to variations
of the risk premium) hedge a higher number of risks.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have empirically examined three theoretical propositions based
on the BBG Model, namely: project portfolio management linked to variations
of the risk premium, stock price variation explained by the risk free rate de-
pending on rm beta, and rm exibility as a new determinant of corporate
hedging decision.
Concerning the link between the choice of projects and the risk premium, we
found no empirical evidence that could validate it, but as exposed in 3.2.2, basic
statistics deliver some hope for the existence of a relation. Further research is
needed, and one of the possible extensions could consist of the estimation of the
rm adaptation mechanism by predicted value of market parameters.
The same conclusion applies for the second theoretical proposition, if we
consider every market parameter of the risk premium. However, our empirical
results show a relation between rm value, its beta and the risk free rate. It
seems that rms with higher beta have their stock price more sensible to risk
free rate variations.
We have constructed an estimator for rm exibility (i.e. rm structure
sensibility to variations of the risk premium), and found evidence for the ex-
planation of the number of operational risks hedged by the Flexibility Factor.
Through an industry analysis, we reinforce our prediction : industries more
exible hedge a higher number of risks.
We have also detected that the dividend yield could be an estimator of
growth opportunities in a nancial risk management framework. Finally, this
study leads us to state that each kind of risk has specic determinants.
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5 Appendix
 Theoretical Literature Review:
Theoretical Incentives for Corporate Hedging Author(s) of Study
Managerial Risk Aversion Smith&Syulz 1985
Stulz 1984
Assymetrical Information between Managers and Investors Breeden&Viswanathan 1998
(Agency cost and equity issuance cost) DeMarzo&Du¢ e 1993
Myers 1977
Lack of Alternative to Hedging within Firms Nance 1993
Stulz 1996
Fewer Regulation Barclay&Smith 1995
(Regulation lower the contracting cost of investment) Mian 1996
Smith&Watts 1992
Convex Tax Function Graham&Smith 1999
(Minimize tax liability) Mayers&Smith 1987
Mian 1996
Smith&Stulz 1985
Stulz 1996
Reduce the Expected Costs of Financial Distress Mayers&Smith 1987
(Reducing the volatility of earnings) Mian 1996
Smith&Stulz 1985
Stulz 1996
Warner 1977
Coordination between Financing and Investment Policy Bessembinder 1991
(Acces to external nancing) Froot&Scharstein 1993
Leland 1998
Mayers&Smith 1987
Mello 1995
Smith&Stulz 1985
Stulz 1996
Ameliorate Conicts of Interest between Shareholders Mayers&Smith 1987
and Bondholders Mian 1996
Myers 1977
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 Empirical Literature Review - Hedging Level - First Part:
Variables Employed Hyp Results Author(s) of Study
LT Debt / MarketValue + Yes Dionne&Garand 2003, Gay&Nam 1998, Graham&Rogers 2000
Haushalter 2000(oil), Howton&Perfect 1998, Tufano 1996(gold)
No Allayanis 2001, Howton&Perfect 1998
Interest Cover - Yes
No Gay&Nam 1998, Howton&Perfect 1998
Credit Rating - Yes Haushalter 2000 (oil)
No Graham&Rogers 2000
Return on Assets Yes Graham&Rogers 2000 (weak)
No Allayanis 2001
R&D + Yes Allayanis 2001, Gay&Nam 1998, Graham&Rogers 2000
Howton&Perfect 1998
No
MarketValue/BookValue + Yes Gay&Nam 1998
No Allayanis 2001, Graham&Rogers 2000
DivYield (1) or Payout (2) + Yes Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ) (2), Dionne&Garand 2003 (1)
No Allayanis 2001 (dummy), Graham&Rogers 2000 (1)
Haushalter 2000 (oil) (2)
Capital Expenditure + Yes Haushalter 2000 (oil, weak)
No Graham&Rogers 2000, Tufano 1996 (gold)
Price Earnings Ratio + Yes Gay&Nam 1998
No Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ)
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 Empirical Literature Review - Hedging Level - Second Part:
Variables Employed Hyp Results Author(s) of Study
Cash Flows - Yes Howton&Perfect 1998
No
Managerial Share + Yes Graham&Rogers 2000, Tufano 1996 (gold)
No Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Gay&Nam 1998, Haushalter 2000 (oil)
Managerial Option - Yes Haushalter 2000 (yes&no) (oil), Tufano 1996 (gold)
No Gay&Nam 1998, Graham&Rogers 2000
Convertible Debt +/- Yes
No Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Gay&Nam 1998, Howton&Perfect 1998
Preference Capital +/- Yes
No Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Gay&Nam 1998, Howton&Perfect 1998
Liquidity - Yes Howton&Perfect 1998, Tufano 1996 (oil)
No Allayanis 2001, Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Haushalter 2000 (oil)
Diversication - Yes
No Haushalter 2000 (oil), Tufano 1997 (gold)
Size + Yes Allayanis 2001, Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Dionne&Garand 2003
Graham&Rogers 2000, Haushalter 2000 (oil)
No Gay&Nam 1998, Tufano 1996 (gold)
NOL carryforward + Yes Berkman&Bradbury 1996 (NZ), Dionne&Garand 2003
No Allayanis 2001, Gay&Nam 1998, Howton&Perfect 1998, Tufano 1996(gold)
Foreign Sales + Yes Allayanis 2001, Graham&Rogers 2000 (weak)
No
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 Empirical Literature Review - Hedging Decision - First Part:
Variables Employed Hyp Results Author(s) of Study
LT Debt / MarketValue + Yes Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Dolde 1995, Foo&Yu 2005
No Allayanis 2001, Fok&Caroll 1997, Francis&Stephan 1993
Géczy&Minton 1997, Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
Interest Cover - Yes Fok&Caroll 1997
No Francis&Stephan 1993, Nance&Smith 1993, Wisocki 1996
Credit Rating - Yes Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Foo&Yu 2005
No Géczy&Minton 1997
R&D + Yes Allayanis 2001, Dolde 1995, Fok&Caroll 1997, Foo&Yu 2005
Géczy&Minton 1997, Nance&Smith 1993 (weak)
No Clark&Judge 2005 (UK)
MarketValue/BookValue + Yes Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
No Allayanis 2001, Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Fok&Caroll 1997
Géczy&Minton 1997, Mian 1996
DivYield(1) or Payout(2) + Yes Foo&Yu 2005 (1), Nance&Smith 1993 (2)
No Allayanis 2001(dummy), Fok&Caroll 1997(1), Wysocki 1996(1)
Managerial Share + Yes Wysocki 1996
No Fok&Caroll 1997, Géczy&Minton 1997
Managerial Option - Yes Foo&Yu 2005, Wysocki 1996
No Géczy&Minton 1997
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 Empirical Literature Review - Hedging Decision - Second Part:
Variables Employed Hyp Results Author(s) of Study
Convertible Debt +/- Yes Fok&Caroll 1997 (weak)
No Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
Preference Capital +/- Yes
No Fok&Caroll 1997, Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
Quick Ratio - Yes Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Fok&Caroll 1997(weak), Foo&Yu 2005
Géczy&Minton 1997
No Allayanis 2001, Nance&Smith 1993
Diversication - Yes
No Fok&Caroll 1997
Size + Yes Allayanis 2001, Fok&Caroll 1997, Foo&Yu 2005, Géczy&Minton 1997
Mian 1996, Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
No
Total Sales + Yes Fok&Caroll 1997, Francis&Stephan 1993
No Dolde 1995
NOL carryforward + Yes Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Foo&Yu 2005
No Allayanis 2001, Dolde 1995, Fok&Caroll 1997, Géczy&Minton 1997
Mian 1996, Nance&Smith 1993, Wysocki 1996
Foreign Sales + Yes Clark&Judge 2005 (UK), Wysocki 1996
No
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 Distribution estimations for CF and SCOR variations by the
kernel-gaussian estimation method:
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 Correlation Table of the variables used in 3.4:
F le x L g (A s s ) D iv Y i M V /B V LT D /M V R & D Q u ick Fo r e ig n S N O L L g (M g S t k )
F le x ib i l i ty 1 .0 0
L o g (A s s e t s ) 0 .1 2 1 .0 0
D iv id e n d Y ie ld 0 .0 6 0 .5 5 1 .0 0
M Va lu e / B Va lu e 0 .0 3 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 1 1 .0 0
LT D eb t /M Va lu e 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .0 1 0 .8 3 1 .0 0
R & D /A s s e t s - 0 .1 6 - 0 .2 1 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 5 - 0 .0 9 1 .0 0
Q u ick R a t io - 0 .1 9 - 0 .2 6 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 7 0 .4 6 1 .0 0
Fo r e ig n S a le s / S a le s - 0 .0 7 0 .0 1 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 6 0 .0 0 0 .4 4 0 .2 7 1 .0 0
N O L /A s s e t s - 0 .0 1 - 0 .1 6 - 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .0 2 0 .2 5 - 0 .0 2 0 .2 3 1 .0 0
L o g (M a n a g e r ia l S t o ck ) - 0 .0 3 0 .2 3 0 .1 5 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 8 - 0 .0 2 0 .0 4 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .1 2 1 .0 0
L o g (M a n a g e r ia l O p t io n ) 0 .0 0 0 .0 5 - 0 .0 1 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 3 0 .0 6 0 .1 6 0 .0 6 - 0 .0 7 0 .2 0
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